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Introduction 
 
In recent years, a spate of cities —
including Boston, Chicago, and Cleveland 
— have shifted governance structures to 
give more control to mayors in the hope 
that such changes would ultimately lead 
to improved school quality and student 
achievement, as well as to diminished 
scandal and turmoil in the school 
systems. A closer look at these instances, 
however, shows that these governance 
changes have to be understood within the 
broader context of a particular city, and 
the particular frustration and challenges 
that led to the willingness to alter the top 
levels of educational control. The ways in 
which mayors have become more 
engaged with schooling have varied —
from low involvement (for example, 
trying to influence traditional school 
board elections) to high involvement 
(gaining formal control over the schools 
or appointment of school board 
members). Just as each city is different, so 
are the impacts (such as can be 
determined) of governance changes. Most 
importantly, it is difficult to link these 
governance shifts to improved 
instructional practices or outcomes. 
 
Background 
 
Changes in American big-city school 
governance frequently focus on reform of 
a prior reform (Tyack & Cuban, 1995). Los 
Angeles, for example, decentralized 
central office control somewhat by 
creating regional superintendents in the 
1970s, abolishing them in the 1980s, and 
then reinstating them in 2000. Reformers 
at the turn-of-the-Twentieth-Century 
wanted to overcome the excessive 
decentralization of ward-based 50-to-100-
member school boards, and the 
corruption of mayoral and city council 
influence in teacher hiring. Tammany 
Hall was the symbol of city government 
in 1900. Consequently, reformers wanted 
school boards independent of city 
government, and touted the seven-
member school board as the best vehicle 
for hiring a superintendent who would 
hire the teachers. One of the prime 
functions of the executive centralization 
of a small board and certified 
administrators was to create a uniform 
citywide curriculum. Mayors were seen 
as part of a discredited, inefficient, 
corrupt regime that did not fit with the 
industrial model of governance that 
envisioned the school superintendent as a 
chief executive officer (Tyack, 1974). 
  
It was not until the 1960s that this 
1900-1920 governance pattern was 
challenged as undemocratic and 
insufficiently representative of minority 
groups. A partial reversion to the earlier 
pattern was instituted. Five- or seven-
member school boards were elected from 
geographic sub-districts of the city and 
exercised tighter oversight of the 
superintendent. Unions became 
omnipresent and major players in board 
elections, and voluminous collective 
bargaining agreements grew annually. 
Administrative decentralization in the 
1970s consisted of area superintendents 
for each of the five or seven districts in a 
city. New interest groups created a 
political pluralism representing such 
interests as handicapped, bilingual, 
disadvantaged, and gifted pupils. Boards 
responded to these multiple governance 
pressures, superintendent turnover 
accelerated, and the era of the 
superintendent as administrative chief 
ended (Wirt & Kirst, 2001). Meanwhile, 
the conditions of children deteriorated 
into massive poverty, and big-city school 
bureaucracies grew even more ineffective 
and inefficient (Kirst & Bulkley, 2000). 
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From 1960 to 1995, some large cities 
like Chicago and Philadelphia preserved 
a role for the mayor in appointing school 
board members, but Baltimore was an 
exception where the mayor continued to 
exert policy control over the schools. As 
the performance of city schools stagnated, 
various governance prescriptions, 
including sub-area decentralization and 
weakly implemented school-based 
management, failed to improve 
performance. City school board members 
increasingly saw their role as 
redistributing school jobs and contracts to 
benefit residents in the geographic slice of 
the city that they represented 
(Danzberger, Kirst, & Usdan, 1992). 
 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
mayors like John Lindsey of New York 
City and Jerome Cavanaugh of Detroit 
stressed that city economies could not be 
substantially improved without good 
schools and middle-class students. But 
these mayors hesitated to seek 
operational control of the schools because 
they feared that the school improvement 
would not be enough to justify their re-
election. During the 1980s, new African 
American mayors such as Harold 
Washington in Chicago and Coleman 
Young in Detroit focused in part on 
redistributing school jobs and services to 
minority communities (Beinart, 1997).
  
The 1990s produced a 180-degree 
reversal in the negative 1900-1920 
Tammany Hall mayoral image. Some 
mayors projected an image of efficient 
public managers less interested in 
redistributing jobs to minorities and more 
interested in improved services. Mayors 
argued that City Hall needed to provide 
more integrated and coherent public 
services, including services for children. 
Better schools were essential to attracting 
the middle class and business to the 
central city. Anti-union Republican state 
legislatures in Illinois, Michigan, and 
Ohio were ready to cut the influence of 
teacher unions and the splintered school 
boards that faced repeated financial 
crises. Education reformers stressed that 
the churn of new policies of each new 
superintendent created lots of wheel-
spinning, but little educational attainment 
(Hess, 1999). 
 
It is too soon to assess whether mayor 
control in such cities as Chicago, 
Cleveland, Harrisburg, and Boston will 
provide more coherent governance and 
improved pupil performance. But there 
are some positive signs. According to 
polls, citizens in Boston and Chicago are 
more pleased with mayoral control than 
the school boards that they replaced. 
Politicians from all over the United States 
have visited Chicago to see the new 
governance model where former city 
employees have taken over key 
bureaucratic operations such as personnel 
and facilities. But in Baltimore, after years 
of dismal pupil attainment and public 
dissatisfaction, the mayor (who never lost 
formal power over the schools) had to 
surrender control to the state. 
 
In 1999, the author served on 
Oakland, California Mayor Jerry Brown’s 
commission on education. The 
commission favored mayoral 
appointment of all school board 
members, but not because the 
commission thought that mayoral control 
was a panacea. As this report 
demonstrates, new governance decisions 
depend largely on judgments about 
conditions in a specific city context at a 
particular point in time. The Oakland 
commission decided that mayoral 
takeover would stimulate more change 
than electing two school board members 
from geographic sub-districts every two 
years. Moreover, in the fragmented policy 
context where a recent state audit 
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indicated the Oakland schools were in a 
desperate plight, the commission judged 
that the mayor had a better chance of 
bringing about new coherent policies. 
Criticism that mayoral appointment of 
school boards provides less democracy 
has justification, but the mayor is also 
elected, and better known by the voters 
than school board members. The 
commission did not have research to 
support mayoral control, so the 
appointment issue was subjected to a 
successful citywide referendum, and in 
four years Oakland voters can decide 
whether they want to restore board 
elections. 
 
We are in an era of experimentation 
with various forms of mayoral influence 
and control in public education. 
Operation of the Chicago schools was 
taken over by former employees of the 
city including Paul Vallas, a versatile 
public administrator, as superintendent. 
Boston schools superintendent Tom 
Payzant, a former superintendent in three 
other cities, is a member of the mayor’s 
cabinet. Boston citizens sometimes take 
their concerns about the schools to the 
city council because the school board is 
advisory and does not react to citizen 
complaints. Under Michigan law, the 
Detroit superintendent has statutory 
powers independent of the Detroit school 
board. Local school board appointees 
select the Detroit superintendent, but a 
representative of state government also 
sits on the school board. Oakland has a 
mixed 10-member board — 7 members 
elected by sub-districts and 3 appointed 
by the mayor. Perhaps the most 
successful city-school turnaround, 
Sacramento, California, has no formal 
mayoral appointment power, but was 
galvanized by the election of a mayoral-
endorsed slate of candidates.  
 
Each new form of governance 
depends on a specific city context, and the 
willingness to make significant changes in 
governance emerges from an intense and 
long-gestating desire for a major shake-
up in school policy and performance. 
Looming in the background in several of 
these cities is the fear of targeted or 
massive voucher schemes if mayoral 
action fails to improve the schools. 
Vouchers and mayoral control co-exist in 
Cleveland, Ohio, for example, where the 
ultimately dominant governance pattern 
is in doubt. 
 
The arguments for mayoral control 
have strong appeal for some. Proponents 
justify giving the mayor control of, or an 
increased role in, the schools because it 
provides a single point of electoral 
accountability, greater integration of 
children’s services with schools, and 
better pupil attainment. Such 
improvements will spur city economic 
development, stimulate more middle-
class people to live in the city, and forge a 
closer alliance between city government 
and businesses. Mayors stress that they 
are in a better position to integrate 
citywide services (such as land use, 
transportation, after-school programs, 
and children’s social services) with the 
schools. Political losers in this governance 
shift are district central-office 
professionals and, most important, the 
school board. 
 
Opponents to mayoral control assert 
that a school board appointed by the 
mayor will result in less democracy 
because voters have fewer electoral 
choices and cannot vote for a board 
member from their section of the city. An 
Institute for Educational Leadership 
study found that electing school boards 
by sub-districts changed the role and 
behavior of school board members 
(Danzberger et al., 1992). Boards became 
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more attentive to the particular needs of 
certain geographical sections of their 
cities. The citywide education policy 
perspective lessened, and board concern 
with geographic redistribution of jobs, 
contacts, and constituent services grew. 
Minority representation on school boards, 
however, increased when citywide 
selection was changed to geographic 
districts. Hispanic groups in the West, for 
example, have strongly supported sub-
district board elections in order to 
increase representation of minority 
groups on school boards. Whether the 
alleged policy benefits of mayoral control 
are worth the loss of better geographic 
representation cannot be decided by 
general theories, but should be submitted 
to the local electorate. 
 
The 1900-1920 movement to centralize 
school governance was justified in part by 
a perception that a citywide curriculum 
was needed to offset multi-lingual 
approaches (Tyack, 1974). This perceived 
need for centralization reoccurred in 1990 
when city reading scores fell extremely 
low. Proponents hoped that increasing 
centralization through mayoral 
appointment would lead to a more 
intense and coordinated focus on reading 
in big cities. Again, we see the reform of 
an earlier reform. It was the alleged 
excessive centralization of curriculum in 
city schools that during the 1960s led in 
part to the call for urban decentralization 
to better meet the needs of diverse pupils 
(Hannaway & Carnoy, 1993). 
 
Governance changes, in short, are a 
way to maximize certain conflicting 
values and policies over others. As values 
and needs change, governance revisions 
such as mayoral control and 
decentralization will recycle. Moreover, 
entirely new governance forms (for 
example, vouchers and contracting with 
private firms to run public schools) might 
be emphasized in the future. Will any of 
these governance alterations change 
classroom instruction, attract quality 
teachers, and improve pupil 
performance? And if they do, what is the 
connection between governance structure 
and improved classroom instruction? 
This report provides an overview of 
recent mayoral-governance changes as a 
prelude to answering these questions in a 
few years.   
 
Every City is Different 
 
Mayors of many cities are using 
different approaches to increase their 
influence over the public schools. Some 
mayors, such as those in Akron, Ohio and 
West Sacramento, California, have only 
gone so far as to threaten takeover unless 
certain school policies change. Other 
mayors, as in Chicago and Boston, have 
taken over their school systems and 
gotten involved in major decisions 
affecting the school systems. In cities like 
San Francisco, the mayor has not sought 
direct control, but has strengthened the 
liaison function between the schools and 
the mayor’s office. San Francisco’s mayor 
hired Ramon Cortines, the former 
superintendent of New York City and San 
Francisco, to perform this function. 
 
The striking thing about the growth of 
mayoral influence over schools is the 
distinctiveness of each city. There are no 
established patterns; form, function, and 
operation of mayoral influence are all 
over the map. These differences reflect 
diverse city contexts, local political 
cultures, interest group structures, 
state/local relations, legal basis of city 
government, historical school governance 
structures, and other specific city 
characteristics. The personalities and 
ambitions of individual mayors are also 
important. Mayor Tom Menino of Boston, 
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for example, featured his school role in 
his successful re-election campaign. 
 
The array of mayoral interventions is 
presented below, ranging from low to 
high influence and providing specific 
examples. Following presentation of the 
array, some interesting city impacts are 
examined in greater depth. 
 
Low Mayoral Influence 
 
Mayors have threatened to take over 
schools, but pulled back when school 
policy changed in Akron, Ohio and West 
Sacramento, California. Mayors in Los 
Angeles and Sacramento, California 
endorsed slates of school board 
candidates and provided substantial 
campaign money and workers for their 
board choices, but they did not seek to 
overthrow the school boards’ powers or 
to appoint board members. 
 
Low-Moderate Mayoral Influence 
 
Mayors appoint some school board 
members, but not a majority of the board. 
Voters in Oakland, California approved a 
city charter amendment enlarging the 
school board from 7 to 10 members, and 
allowing Mayor Jerry Brown to appoint 3 
members. The mayor’s appointees 
formed a minority voting bloc that 
opposed the superintendent more often 
than the elected members. The Oakland 
mayor wanted to appoint the entire 
school board, but could not obtain city 
council approval for more than 3 of the 10 
members. Of the three candidates 
endorsed by the mayor, only two were 
successful. 
 
Until recently, the mayor of 
Baltimore, Maryland appointed all school 
board members because Baltimore never 
had an elected school board. However, in 
1997, Baltimore received $230 million in 
state aid and, in return, the mayor lost his 
prerogative to appoint all members of the 
board of education. In its place, the 
mayor and governor jointly appointed a 
new nine-member board of 
commissioners, based on a nominating 
slate provided by the State Board of 
Education. The following affiliations and 
expertise were required of the new board 
of commissioners: at least four 
commissioners had to have a high level of 
expertise in a large business, non-profit, 
or governmental entity; at least three had 
to have a high level of knowledge and 
expertise in education; at least one 
commissioner had to be a parent of a 
student enrolled in the district; and at 
least one commissioner had to have 
knowledge or experience in educating 
children with disabilities. The new board 
of commissioners (unlike the old board 
which had been appointed by and 
controlled by one individual) is vested 
with full authority and responsibility for 
running the school system. In addition, a 
14-member parent and community 
advisory board was formed to solicit 
parental input and involvement (Cibulka, 
2001). The Baltimore mayor has selected 
people with established credentials to 
serve on the new board of commissioners, 
including an education professor, a 
facilities management expert, and two 
other academics. 
 
After Anthony Williams was elected 
mayor of Washington, DC in 1998, he 
sought more control over school policy by 
proposing that he would appoint all 11 
school board members. As in Oakland, 
the city council resisted this, arguing in 
favor of more electoral representation. 
The parties compromised by creating a 
hybrid nine-member board — four 
selected by the mayor, four elected from 
new geographic districts, and the 
president elected in a citywide 
referendum. District voters can revisit the 
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governance structure through a 
referendum to be held after four years 
(Cibulka, 2001). 
 
The mayor of New York City 
currently appoints two members and the 
city’s five borough presidents each 
appoint one member to the citywide 
school board. Newly elected Mayor 
Michael Bloomberg has said he will lobby 
state legislators to abolish the board and 
have the schools operated by a 
commissioner of education who would 
report directly to the mayor. 
 
Moderate Mayoral Influence 
 
The Detroit mayor appoints six 
members and the governor appoints one 
member to the city’s school board. In 
some decisions, however, the governor’s 
choice has veto power over the mayor’s 
six appointees. For example, the 
governor’s representative vetoed first 
choice of Mayor Dennis Archer’s 
appointees for superintendent. But the 
Detroit board does little other than choose 
the superintendent, approve the 
superintendent’s appointees, and 
approve the annual school improvement 
plans. The mayor’s deputy press secretary 
has said, “The mayor has no direct 
involvement in the schools…he has 
enough on his plate trying to run the 10th 
largest city” (Community Renewal 
Society, 2001, p. 12). In addition, a 
Michigan law has terminated the Detroit 
principals’ union in order to provide the 
superintendent with more flexibility. 
 
The Cleveland mayor, under state 
legislation, appoints the school board and 
the district’s chief executive officer (CEO). 
After 30 months, however, the mayor can 
fire the CEO, but only with concurrence 
of the board he appointed. Mayor 
Michael White has chosen not to get 
visibly involved in school policy or 
operations. Mayor White’s relationship 
with CEO Barbara Byrd-Bennett is similar 
to the relationship between a non-
executive chairman and a CEO in private 
business (Community Renewal Society, 
2001, p. 6). Mayor White has been most 
active in improving facilities, but he 
meets infrequently with the school board. 
He is kept informed, but has chosen to let 
CEO Byrd-Bennett be the public leader. 
Both mayoral candidates in the 2001 
election supported the existing system, 
but in 2002 Cleveland voters will have to 
decide whether or not to reauthorize 
mayoral control.  
 
Philadelphia moved to the high-
influence category after the voters 
approved a 2000 charter initiative 
enabling the mayor to appoint all school 
board members at one time. 
Philadelphia’s previous mayor, Ed 
Rendell, could appoint board members in 
staggered terms, and he chose to defer to 
his choice for superintendent on matters 
of education policy and operational 
decisions. Current Philadelphia Mayor 
John Street has appointed a person in his 
office to follow school policy closely and 
to work with the board-appointed CEO. 
Mayor Street has been able to increase the 
number of charter schools in Philadelphia 
(serving 6.5% of total enrollment in 2001) 
despite resistance from the teachers’ 
union. A huge district deficit in 2001 
forced Mayor Street to negotiate with the 
state to provide more aid to Philadelphia 
schools in exchange for greater state 
policy control. The governor hired the 
for-profit Edison Schools to rethink 
governance and school improvement. The 
Philadelphia Inquirer described the state 
proposal this way:  
 
Governor Schweiker’s Philadelphia plan 
would transfer control of the school system 
from local officials to his appointees, who 
would then put its management in the hands 
 
6 
Mayoral Influence, New Regimes, and Public School Governance Kirst 
of a private corporation — almost certainly 
the for-profit Edison. Another seismic 
proposal: turning over the 60 lowest-
achieving schools to partnerships of 
community groups or universities and private 
school-management firms. 
 
The governor and other proponents of the plan 
have cast it as a prototype for urban education 
reform in the 21st century, one that opens new 
opportunities for community leadership of the 
schools. An angry Mayor Street, on the other 
hand, has called it “fantasyland” and 
“unacceptable.” 
 
If no agreement is reached, a board — with 
four of five members named by the governor 
— would control the district for the next five 
years and impose his original plan (“Lessons 
from School Takeovers,” 2001). 
 
In response to Mayor Street’s 
objections, the governor agreed to drop 
Edison’s central management of the 
system, but insisted on district 
governance by a five-member School 
Reform Commission, with three members 
appointed by the governor and two 
appointed by the mayor. A super 
majority of four is needed for many key 
decisions, including selection of the 
district CEO, adoption of the 
Commission’s by-laws, selection of an 
independent evaluator, borrowing of 
money, and appointment of a general 
counsel. In effect, the mayor’s two 
appointees have veto power over these 
matters.  
 
High Mayoral Influence  
 
 The 1995 Chicago governance 
changes granting an enhanced role to the 
mayor were layered over reforms 
instituted in 1988. The earlier reforms, 
which were supported by state 
Democrats and civic activists, shifted 
power from the district to Local School 
Councils that appointed principals and 
allocated significant discretionary money 
at each school. The mayor’s ability to 
appoint the city’s school board was 
decreased under the 1988 legislation. The 
impetus for decentralization was not a 
desire to increase the influence of 
educators. Shipps (2000) says, “Educators 
were blamed for the problems and their 
discretion curtailed.” Rather, the 
legislation was designed to enhance the 
influence of parents and community 
members. 
 
While the 1988 reforms pushed 
control toward the schools, the 1995 
legislation shifted power up the ladder to 
the mayor. Chicago Mayor Richard Daley 
favored this shift, but did not pursue it 
publicly as the previous mayor had. Led 
by Republican state legislators, the 1995 
governance change emphasized 
centralizing political accountability with 
the mayor, adding the new structure on 
top of the 1988 reform, rather than 
replacing it.   
 
The 1995 changes gave the Chicago 
mayor more authority than any mayor 
since before the Progressive Era, 
effectively turning the public education 
system into a department of city 
government (Shipps, 2000). The 1995 
legislation eliminated the school board 
nominating committee, which had 
effectively minimized the mayor’s ability 
to select school board members, and 
replaced the traditional board with a 
corporate-style board. Under the new 
structure, only one of five board members 
was to focus on education (the chief 
education officer), and there was a CEO, 
rather than a superintendent. The 
legislation limited the rights of unions to 
strike, and redefined a large number of 
issues as non-bargainable. The 1995 
legislation enabled Chicago to contract 
for many building repairs, services, and 
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purchases instead of employing 
numerous union personnel as under the 
old system. 
 
Mayoral appointment of the school 
board in Boston began in 1991. In 1996, 
Mayor Menino made his choice for 
superintendent, former San Diego 
Superintendent Tom Payzant, a member 
of his cabinet. The school board had been 
reduced to an advisory role, and the 
Mayor urged voters to hold him 
accountable for school performance. A 
1996 referendum to retain the mayoral-
appointed board was supported by 70% 
of Boston’s voters, with only African 
American communities opposed. Board 
meetings were generally brief and poorly 
attended, while the real decisions were 
made by the superintendent and mayor. 
Mayor Menino acknowledged that the 
appointed board had not been accessible 
to public concerns, but said he and the 
superintendent would attend more to this 
function (Yee, 2000). 
 
Impact of Mayoral Control 
 
It is not possible to link many changes 
in school policy and practice to changes 
in governance. Some major trends can be 
attributed in part to mayoral intervention, 
although there is no apparent relationship 
between level (low, moderate, or high) of 
mayoral influence and the impact on 
schools. For example, Mayor Joe Serna of 
Sacramento (low influence) recruited, 
financed, and supported a slate of school 
board candidates, but left them alone to 
do their jobs. Education Week reported the 
following results: 
 
Many in California’s capital city of 369,000 
credit Mr. Serna, who died of cancer 
November 7, 2001, for pushing changes that 
now have more children reading at earlier 
ages, more school buildings scheduled for 
repair, and more politicians and parents 
backing an urban school system that was once 
considered a total loss. 
 
In the past year, the 52,000-student district’s 
test scores in elementary-age reading and 
math have shown dramatic increases that 
would be the envy of any school system. A 
focused, determined school board, with a 
majority of members who were backed and 
supported by Mayor Serna, has ended the 
bickering and deadlock that plagued the 
district’s governance for years. The public has 
shown renewed confidence and interest in the 
schools by passing, in October, the district’s 
first bond measure for school repairs in more 
than 20 years. 
 
And despite some criticism of how the changes 
are being carried out, Sacramento is being 
looked at nationwide as a model of urban 
school success (“Sacramento Mayor’s 
Legacy,” 2000). 
 
In addition, the Sacramento school board 
elevated the deputy superintendent to the 
top job, and he focused on changing 
instruction through the Open Court 
standardized reading program. 
 
Los Angeles Mayor Richard Riordan 
(low influence) used a school board 
electoral strategy that raised $2 million 
for a successful election. The mayor’s 
reform board recruited former Colorado 
Governor Roy Romer to be 
superintendent. Romer re-centralized 
some instructional policy and, like 
Sacramento, installed Open Court as the 
standard reading program. The Los 
Angeles results on the state test (Stanford-
9) have not been as impressive as 
Sacramento’s to date, but Superintendent 
Romer has won the support of the Los 
Angeles Times. Mayor Riordan also used 
the influence of his office to speed 
approval of new school construction in 
this rapidly growing district.   
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Among the moderately influential 
mayors, Cleveland’s Mayor White 
actively promoted the successful $1.4 
billion 2001 referendum to replace aging 
roofs, faulty wiring, rotted windows, and 
other chronic school building problems. 
Cleveland political observers contend that 
the voter support needed to upgrade the 
schools (average age of 51 years) was 
generated in part by increased public 
confidence in the new CEO, Barbara 
Byrd-Bennett. In 1999, Byrd-Bennett 
announced instructional reforms and 
accountability changes that centralized 
the system and de-emphasized past 
policies to provide parents with greater 
school site influence (Ryan, 2001). The 
impact of her reforms is unclear, but 
Byrd-Bennett is so popular that mayoral 
candidates hoping to replace Mayor 
White in 2001 sought her endorsement. 
 
Mayors perhaps have the least impact 
where the mayor’s powers are least clear, 
as in Oakland and Detroit. In Oakland 
(low-moderate influence), Mayor Jerry 
Brown has focused more on charter 
schools; his three mayoral appointees 
have not coalesced with the seven elected 
board members and their appointed 
superintendent. The new superintendent 
in Detroit has a lot of formal power, but 
has not sought a close relationship with 
city government, perhaps because the 
mayor’s term expired in January 2002. 
The Washington, DC school system has 
made progress in restoring public 
confidence under the leadership of 
experienced superintendent Paul Vance, 
who once headed the large nearby 
suburban system in Montgomery County, 
Maryland (Cibulka, 2001). 
 
The state-ordered demise of the 
Detroit school board was viewed by city 
voters as usurpation without any local 
legitimacy (Gewertz, 2000). Despite 
media support for the new regime (low-
moderate influence), public opinion polls 
have indicated that voters, under the 
referendum allowed by the state law, 
want to return to an elected board in 
2003. The last president of the Detroit 
school board was indicted on corruption 
charges. The new superintendent has 
managed to build more schools and make 
badly needed repairs, but the elected 
board could not agree on how much to 
spend of the $1.3 billion bond approved 
in 1993. Both mayoral candidates 
supported the new superintendent who 
has two more years to make a bigger 
impact (D. Plank, interview, November 
2001).  
 
The cases of Boston and Chicago (high 
influence) have received the most 
academic scrutiny. In both cities, the 
primary movers behind the governance 
changes granting more power to the 
mayors were the business community, 
the mayor (especially in Boston), and 
state legislators. Local groups, such as 
community activists and minority group 
representatives, were not directly 
involved; educator organizations 
including the teacher unions were either 
peripheral to the debate or opposed to the 
change. 
 
The proponents of the governance 
changes in Boston and Chicago had 
certain similar goals, but also some 
important differences. There was a strong 
emphasis in Chicago on improving the 
efficiency of the public schools, 
particularly the fiscal efficiency of the 
district. Shipps (2000) notes that the 1995 
governance changes were a continuation 
of longstanding efforts to improve 
efficiency and restructure accountability. 
This emphasis reflected the interests of 
the Chicago business community. 
Improved efficiency was a factor in 
Boston, but not as central as the issues of 
standards and curriculum (Yee, 2000). 
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The role and purpose of the district 
leader was another difference between 
the reforms in these two cities. Reflecting 
the focus on efficiency, the Chicago Public 
Schools would be led by a business-style 
CEO, rather than a traditional 
superintendent. In contrast, the Boston 
mayor wanted a strong educator-leader at 
the head of the school system. Boston’s 
Mayor Menino wanted to be held 
accountable for the state of the Boston 
Public Schools, and he wanted to be 
directly involved in the district’s 
operations. He wanted to place a strong 
superintendent who would be a part of 
the mayor’s cabinet, and who would not 
have to contend with the many demands 
of an elected School Committee. The 
intentions of those who initiated the 
governance changes in Chicago and 
Boston were reflected in their 
implementation, especially in the interests 
and styles of the new leaders chosen with 
strong mayoral input. 
 
The governance changes that shifted 
power toward the Chicago and Boston 
mayors set the stage for substantial 
alterations within these two school 
systems. The mayors and their chosen 
leaders took advantage of the new 
structural changes to implement 
substantive reforms. Paul Vallas, former 
Chicago budget director, assumed the 
new position of CEO of the Chicago 
Public Schools. The selection of Vallas 
reflected the business community’s 
interest in a leader from outside 
traditional public education. Vallas 
believed that clear accountability, in 
combination with running the district 
more like a business, would lead to an 
improved organization. In this top-down 
change model, management creates the 
vision and defines clear sanctions for 
individuals and schools that fail to 
progress toward that vision (Shipps, 
2000). 
The selection of Tom Payzant as 
superintendent of the Boston schools was 
a far more traditional choice for district 
leader. His selection reflected Mayor 
Menino’s interest in a professional 
educator who would avoid, to some 
extent, the political issues that consumed 
much of the time of previous 
superintendents. Payzant’s approach was 
within the framework of traditional 
education reform; his primary focus 
reflected a professional education model 
involving higher standards and capacity-
building (Yee, 2000).  
 
The new governance structures in 
Chicago and Boston, in combination with 
the mayors and district leaders who 
sought to improve the school systems, 
resulted in changes that reflected the 
different intentions of those who sought 
the new structures. In both cities, there 
were shifts in the practical operations of 
the district and in the overall message 
about teaching and learning sent by the 
mayors and the education leaders. 
 
Some very visible and practical 
changes occurred in the first years 
following the 1995 reform in Chicago. For 
the first time in years, the school district 
budget appeared to be in reasonable 
shape. This change may have been due in 
part to Mayor Daley’s willingness to 
support the schools through property tax 
increases and funds diverted from other 
parts of the city budget. In addition, there 
was relative labor peace in the Chicago 
Public Schools. There has not been a 
strike since the governance changes took 
place.  
 
Some major changes occurred 
following the arrival of former city 
budget director Vallas at the district’s 
central office. Roughly 100 former City 
Hall employees came to work in the 
central office, displacing more traditional 
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education staff. In addition to the CEO, 
the leadership of the Chicago school 
district was now largely from the 
business sector, rather than from 
education. School-site councils still exist 
at all the Chicago public schools, but their 
influence has been reduced; new central 
office leaders have increased their role in 
the operation of the schools. The 
combination of no budget crises, no 
strikes, and generally positive public 
opinion of the reforms instituted by 
Vallas has improved the legitimacy of the 
school system over the last several years 
(Shipps, 2000.) 
 
The direct impact of the changes in 
the governance structure of the Boston 
Public Schools has not been as marked as 
in Chicago. The most notable change was 
the elimination of the bitter battles within 
the school committee and between the 
committee and the mayor — a logical 
outcome of having an appointed rather 
than elected school committee. The 
committee included allies first of then-
Mayor Raymond Flynn, and later of 
Mayor Menino. Many committee 
members had close ties to the business 
community. As in Chicago, labor 
relations, particularly with the teachers’ 
union, improved in the years following 
the governance change. Also similar to 
Chicago, some of the most blatant budget 
problems disappeared in Boston. The 
Boston mayor has always influenced how 
much money is spent by the public school 
system, but the new governance changes 
allowed the mayor also to influence how 
the funds were spent. Unlike in Chicago, 
however, there were no dramatic changes 
in the structure or staffing of the district’s 
central office, and no transfer of city 
employees to key positions in the 
district’s central office (Yee, 2000). But 
Mayor Menino has provided a clear focus 
for public accountability by saying to the 
electorate that he wants to be judged for 
election by school improvement (Yee, 
2000). 
 
The style and substance of the 
education reforms taking place within 
these governance changes are quite 
different in the two cities. The overall 
focus in Chicago has been on 
accountability, defined largely by test 
scores and taking action where schools 
and students do not meet predefined 
goals. According to Shipps, the emphasis 
has been on strong and immediate 
sanctions for principals of schools that 
did not meet performance goals set by 
CEO Vallas. This was especially true for 
schools whose students fell into the 
bottom 25% of test scores in the district; 
these schools faced high-stakes 
consequences such as probation and 
reconstitution. For students, there were 
new and high-stakes repercussions for 
low-test scores as well. The most public 
example was Vallas’s call to end social 
promotion. Students who did not meet 
required performance levels at certain 
grades faced mandatory summer school 
and generally would not be promoted if 
their test scores did not rise adequately 
by the end of the summer session. 
 
These accountability measures mostly 
focused on minimal standards and 
improving the educational outcomes of 
low-performing students in Chicago’s 
schools, but there were also changes 
affecting students at the upper end of the 
performance spectrum. For example, 
Vallas supported the creation and 
expansion of alternatives, including 
magnet schools, charter schools, and 
accelerated programs such as 
International Baccalaureate options. In 
addition to efforts removing 
“troublesome or slow-learning students” 
from regular public schools to other 
settings such as transition centers and 
alternative high schools, there was a push 
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for more “upper-end” options linked to 
the goal of attracting middle-class 
families back to the Chicago Public 
Schools. 
 
Overall, Vallas based his efforts on 
two assumptions. First was the 
assumption that much of the capacity 
needed to improve performance was 
already available within the public school 
system, but incentives and sanctions were 
necessary to elicit this pre-existing 
capacity. Thus, there has been less 
emphasis on building additional capacity 
in Chicago than in other districts, such as 
Boston. The second assumption was that 
test scores, while not a perfect measure, 
were the most logical means of assessing 
progress in providing quality education. 
However, when test scores maintained a 
plateau in 2001, Mayor Daley decided 
Vallas had done all he could do to 
improve test scores, and forced him and 
the board president out. Accountable to 
the electorate for major changes in policy 
and personnel, the mayor thought the 
district needed to supplement its get-
tough accountability policy. The new 
Chicago superintendent is searching for 
better instructional strategies with greater 
impact.  
 
In November 2001, the Illinois State Board of 
Education included three-fourths of the state’s 
elementary schools on its academic Early 
Warning List, based on state assessment 
scores. Sixty-seven of Chicago’s 76 high 
schools failed the Eleventh Grade Prairie State 
Achievement Exam. Still, while statewide 
scores remained flat, Chicago’s overall state 
test scores rose slightly and Mayor Daley’s 
new magnet schools had some of the highest 
scores in the state. Five of the state’s top 10 
elementary schools were in Chicago, but so 
were 21 of the state’s bottom 25 schools. 
Chicago’s chief accountability officer defended 
the magnet schools, “If we did not have these 
[magnet] programs, we would probably lose 
these kids to private and parochial schools” 
(Banchero, Olszewski, & Dougherty, 2001). 
 
The style of the education reforms 
undertaken in Boston arose from a similar 
governance change, but the experience 
was quite different from Chicago. Former 
Mayor Flynn and Superintendent Lois 
Harrison-Jones were the first leaders to 
experience the mayorally appointed 
school committee, but the major changes 
largely resulted from the actions of 
Mayor Menino and Superintendent 
Payzant. In contrast with Chicago’s CEO 
Vallas who was an education outsider, 
Payzant was very much the professional 
superintendent who wanted to work 
primarily within existing structures. 
Vallas relied heavily on the existing 
capacity within the school system; 
Payzant focused on increasing capacity. 
According to Yee (2000), “Payzant 
emphasized his long-term commitment to 
steady, resolute progress through staff 
training, new materials, and high 
standards.”  
 
Improvement strategies employed by 
Payzant included raising standards, 
leadership development, whole-school 
change, and developing a reorganization 
plan focused on student performance. His 
focus on teaching and learning relied to 
some extent on professional norms, rather 
than sanctions, as a means of improving 
performance. Unlike Chicago under 
Vallas, there has been little change in the 
tenure of administrators or teachers in 
Boston, and no talk of school-site 
reconstitution. Payzant introduced school 
report cards that included Stanford-9 test 
results. Payzant replaced the district’s 
standardized test with the Stanford-9 
because he believed it better reflected the 
district’s new standards that emphasized 
higher-order skills. 
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The new governance frameworks in 
Boston and Chicago set similar stages for 
educational reform, but the leaders in 
these two cities used the expanded role of 
the mayor to make quite different 
changes. Both cities had strong mayors 
and sufficiently large problems in their 
schools that the state legislatures (and, 
the individual voters in Boston) were 
motivated to enact major structural 
changes. The actual regime change 
occurred, however, when the mayors, 
school leaders, and others used the 
governance changes to significantly alter 
the administrative and educational 
practices of the district leadership, and 
through these alterations, change the 
practices of educators in the schools. 
 
The different directions taken by 
Boston and by Chicago leaders were not 
just whims of the individual mayors and 
school district chiefs. To some extent the 
different directions reflected the historical 
political culture and the desires of 
powerful constituencies within these 
cities and states. The regime changes 
particularly reflected the different 
emphases of the business communities in 
Boston and Chicago. Selection of a 
business-style leader like Vallas to lead 
the Chicago school system was not 
surprising given the role of the business 
community and Republican legislative 
leaders in initiating the 1995 reform. The 
focus on management issues in Chicago is 
consistent with the interests of its 
business community. The Boston business 
community, however, tended to focus 
more on issues of school quality, so an 
experienced superintendent was a more 
acceptable choice. 
 
The regime changes in both cities are 
still relatively new. But there is little 
indication that there will be a return, at 
least not in the near future, to the 
previous governance structures. It is more 
likely there will be ongoing tinkering 
within the present regimes than major 
structural changes.  
 
Wong and Shen (2001) have 
compared the effects of mayoral takeover 
in Boston and Chicago with state 
takeover in Lawrence, Massachusetts and 
Compton, California. They concluded 
that mayoral takeover had a positive 
impact on pupil achievement: 
 
First, mayoral takeover is linked to increases 
in student achievement at the elementary 
grades. Second, gains in achievement are 
especially large for the lowest-performing 
schools, suggesting that mayoral takeovers 
involve a special focus on these failing schools. 
Third, mayoral takeover seems less effective 
for the upper grades, where the cumulative 
effects of many years of poor schooling are not 
easily reversible. Fourth, when state takeovers 
produce administrative and political turmoil, 
student achievement suffers. After a period of 
adjustment, however, state takeovers may also 
be able to produce positive achievement gains. 
 
Wong and Shen (2001) write that 
mayoral control had other attributes: 
 
Our analysis of city and state takeovers 
suggests the following conclusions. First, 
there are significant differences between 
mayoral takeover and state takeovers, and 
mayoral takeovers appear to be more 
productive in terms of academic improvement. 
Mayoral takeovers may make a significant 
impact on the lowest-performing schools. 
Second, takeovers may also produce more 
efficient financial and administrative 
management, and in the case of mayoral 
takeover, lead to a broadening of management 
expertise. Third, both city and state takeovers 
bring with them a heavy emphasis on 
academic accountability, and mayoral 
takeovers are more likely to utilize additional 
tests beyond state-mandated exams. 
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Table 1. Outcomes in Mayor-controlled School Districts 
 
Outcome Boston Chicago Philadelphia 
Aligned curriculum, 
tests, professional 
development, and 
rewards/penalties 
 
Moderate Low Low 
Political support of 
district reforms 
 
High High Low 
Improved coordination 
of city and school 
services 
 
Slight Slight None 
Increased turnover 
among: 
 
  Teachers 
     
  Principals 
 
 
 
Moderate 
 
High 
 
 
 
Moderate 
 
High 
 
 
 
High 
 
High 
 
Improved test scores: 
 
  Elementary 
 
  Secondary 
 
Reduced gap between 
white and minority 
scores 
 
 
 
Slight 
 
No 
 
No 
 
 
Moderate 
 
No 
 
No 
 
 
Moderate 
 
No 
 
No 
 
 
Source: L. Cuban and M. Usdan. (2002). Powerful Reforms with Shallow Roots: Getting Good Schools in Six Cities. 
New York: Teachers College Press. 
 
 
The Six-City Study 
 
Research scholars have conducted 
case studies of six cities1 that used 
mayoral control or school boards that 
appointed unconventional 
superintendents who had no prior 
experience in education administration 
(Cuban & Usdan, 2002). In general, 
under mayoral control they found 
improvement over the previous regime 
of school boards, but little evidence of 
reaching higher goals such as 
widespread instructional improvement 
in classrooms. The researchers did find 
“partial evidence of increased city and 
school coordination,” but not at the level 
that mayoral-control advocates hoped 
would take place. An overview of the 
findings for the three mayoral-control 
cities is presented in Table 1. 
                                                          
1 These cities were Chicago, Boston, San Diego, 
Seattle, Philadelphia, and Baltimore. 
 
The six-city study found that Boston 
was making progress in aligning the 
various elements of its systemic strategy 
to support principals and teachers in 
helping students to improve academic 
performance, but Chicago and 
Philadelphia were not. Support from 
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business, media, and elites were 
strongly favorable of mayoral actions in 
Boston and Chicago. But, as Cuban and 
Usdan (2002) note: 
 
Although the Chicago and Philadelphia 
cases offer instances of CEOs decisively 
acting in determining budgets, waiving 
rules, and slicing through bureaucratic 
layers, the accumulated evidence for the two 
cities counter civic and business leaders’ 
deep wish to connect governance changes 
and better management to improved student 
outcomes. 
 
Cuban and Usdan applaud Boston 
for its leadership stability in extending 
Superintendent Payzant’s contract from 
1996 to 2005. They contend that a school 
without broader linkages to city, 
community, and private out-of-school 
services has little chance of success. 
 
Conclusion 
 
There is no political majority urging 
return to school board-dominated 
regimes in any of the cities that moved 
toward greater mayoral influence over 
the schools. Boston voters have 
reauthorized mayoral control in Boston, 
and the Illinois legislature extended the 
Chicago mayor’s regime for another 
three years. Sacramento does not regret 
former Mayor Serna’s campaign for a 
new board. Detroit has seen the 
president of its prior school board 
indicted for corruption. Still, the impact 
of enhanced mayoral influence on 
instruction remains tenuous and unclear 
(Rich, 1996). Mayors are able to help 
balance the budget, improve buildings, 
and increase school supplies, but 
intervention in the classroom is more 
difficult. The most notable trend in these 
cities, however, is the diversity of the 
governance arrangements and how local 
context and civic culture determine 
whatever outcomes ensue (Stone, 1998). 
While some mayors got involved in the 
details of school management, others 
provided their appointed 
superintendents wide discretion in 
running the schools. Increased 
centralized control of education policy 
was a consistent trend among these 
districts; there was no district where 
mayoral influence was primarily 
oriented to decentralizing policymaking 
to the schools.   
 
Mayor Menino of Boston and Mayor 
Daley of Chicago sought to become the 
central symbol of school accountability, 
while Detroit Mayor Archer and 
Cleveland Mayor White preferred to 
stay behind the scenes and have the 
superintendent the focus of 
accountability. Several mayoral regimes 
need to be reauthorized by the voters in 
the next five years. These elections will 
determine in large part whether 1995-
2001 was just another quick cycle of 
mayoral influence, or a more lasting 
governance change (Boyd and Cibulka, 
2002). Even if these new regimes are 
extended, there are limits to mayoral 
influence and control:   
 
In other words, mayoral control of urban 
schools is merely one reform strategy.  
Changing governance arrangements clearly 
can make a difference in the way urban 
public school systems function, but such a 
strategy requires the right combination of 
ingredients — committed and skilled 
leadership by the mayor, willingness to use 
scarce resources, a stable coalition of 
supporters, appropriate education policies, 
and a cadre of competent, committed 
professionals to implement the reforms 
(Cibulka, 2001, p. 35). 
 
State domination of governance, 
where mayors play a secondary role to 
the state as in Philadelphia and 
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Baltimore, is one possibility for more 
urban districts. Mayors may have to 
demonstrate increases in pupil 
attainment and financial stability in 
order to ward off state intervention. The 
mayors of Baltimore and Philadelphia 
traded increased state aid for increased 
state control, so city economic growth 
may be a crucial factor. Slow-growing 
city economies will reduce local tax 
revenues and lead to calls for financial 
bail-outs by the states. States, however, 
seem less inclined to provide more 
money without a greater governance 
role, including state appointment of 
board members.   
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